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THE IMPROBABLE TRANSFORMATION OF
INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS: CRIME,




At the peak of the crack epidemic in many American cit-
ies-when people seemed ready to write off inner cities as hope-
lessly lost-a remarkable transformation began to take place. In
a global economy where the gap between the haves and the
have-nots continued to increase at an alarming rate, inner city
neighborhoods defied nearly all expectations and with minimal
outside intervention, mounted an improbable comeback. The
most visible and trumpeted manifestation of this rebirth was a
plummeting crime rate which, in the latter half of the 1990s, fell
to lows not seen in more than thirty years.2 Incumbent politi-
cians and law enforcement officials rushed to take credit, while
the media and social scientists scrambled to explain how this
seemingly unlikely turn of events could have happened in cities
that had been unflinchingly described as being undermined
and overrun by drugs, crime and violence.3
"Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, John Jay College of Criminal
Justice; Principal Research Associate, National Development and Research Institutes,
Inc.
' KirkJohnson, Washington Steps Back, and Cities Recover, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997,
§ 4 at 5.
2 Fox Butterfield, Number of Vrictims of Crime Fell Again in '96, Study Says:. Lowest Level
Since Reports Began in 1973, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at 118; Clifford Krauss, New York
Crime Rate Plummets to Levels Not Seen in 30 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al.
3 See, e. g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNIY 57-69 (1990); WILLTAmJ. BENNETr ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERT..
. AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 18-25 (1996); DALE D.
CHITWOOD ET AL., THE AMERICAN PIPE DREAM: CRACK COCAINE AND THE INNER CITY ix-xii
(1996); FELIX PADILLA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 1-10 (1992); Jeffrey Fa-
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The reduction of crime was startling because it contradicted
two powerful assumptions about life in the United States. The
first was that cities were becoming progressively more dangerous
places to live. In this formulation, not only were Americans
more at risk for becoming victims of violent crime, they were
also more likely to become perpetrators of crime as a result of
the deterioration of civil society and greater exposure to vio-
lence and an unsavory environment.4 With great alarm, the
media, social scientists and policy makers proclaimed that the
hegemony enjoyed by white middle class culture was being
steadily eroded by the insidious spread of an amoral lifestyle
characterized by crime, violence and drug misuse that perco-
lated out from inner city neighborhoods to infect suburbs and
rural America.5 In the drive to overtake the hearts and minds of
America's youth, this self-destructive city-born subculture vio-
lated the taboo boundaries of race/ethnicity, gender and age.
The threat to mainstream America was no longer exclusively
embodied by black urban males, but increasingly included
whites, females, country folk, and, most disturbingly, children.6
gan, The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug Dealing Among Urban Gangs, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 633, 659-62 (1989); Bruce D. Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner Cir.
Impact on Hard Drug Users and the Community, in 13 DRUGS AND CRIME 9, 9-11 (Michael
Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990); Thomas Mieczkowski, The Operational Styles of
Crack Houses in Detroit, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: CAUSES, CORRELATES, AND
CONSEQUENCES 60-91 (NIDA Research Monograph 103) (Mario De La Rosa et al. eds.,
1990); Wesley G. Skogan, Social Change and the Future of Violent Crime, in 1 VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 235, 235-50 (T.R. Gurr ed., 1989); Rodrick Wallace & Deborah Wallace, Con-
tagious Urban Decay and the Collapse of Public Health, 21 HEALTH/PAC BULLETIN 13, 13-
18 (1991). CfJAMESA. INGIARDI ETAL., WOMENAND CRACK-COCAINE 11-12 (1993).
' See, e.g., BENNETT ET AL., supra note 3, at 26-33; RICHARD CLOWARD & LLOYD OHLIN,
DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY: A THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS 146-49 (1960);
Ramiro MartinezJr., Latinos and Lethal Violence: The Impact of Poverty and Inequality, 43
SOC. PROBS. 131, 132 (1996); Walter Miller, Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of
Gang Delinquency, 14 J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 5-19 (1958); Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence
Beget Violence? A Critical Examination of the Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 3-28 (1989).
See, e.g., JOHN HAGEDORN & PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME, AND
THE UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY 150-63 (1988); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG & FRANCO
FERRACUT, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY IN
CRIMINOLOGY 296-300 (1967); Jack Gladstein et al., A Comparison of Inner-City and Up-
per-Middle Class Youths'Exposure to Violence, 13J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 275, 279 (1992).
6See e.g., FREDAADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL 1-3
(1975); ANNE CAMPBELL, THE GIRLS IN THE GANG: A REPORT FROM NEWYORK CITY 4-32
(1984); INCIARDI ET AL., supra note 3, at 19-21; IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG
PROBLEM: A COMMUNriYAPPROACH, 10 (1995); D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILDREN OF THE
1234 [Vol. 88
I"NNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS
The second assumption was that children, the least pre-
pared to withstand the rigors of life in a postmodern world,
were becoming more violent. Forced to grow up too soon, kids
could no longer be kids and the critical period of adolescence
was squeezed out as they transitioned directly into adulthood.
Rushed along by care givers who force fed them in preparation
for the working world or, alternatively, ignored by self-absorbed
parents and left to fend for themselves, children experienced
puberty at a much earlier age and the powerful hormonal cock-
tail that coursed through their bodies was left unregulated by
the missing reins of moral reasoning or the calming influence
of family and community. Bereft of guidance and safe passage
to adulthood, children were increasingly cast adrift to define
themselves in a hostile world.8 Many children found that they
must "pack guns instead of lunches"9 to fight their way out of
childhood in an upward spiral of violence. Some researchers
NIGHT: A STUDY OF ADOLESCENT PROSTITUTION 110 (1985); Deborah Baskin et al., The
Political Economy of Volent emale Street Crime, 20 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 401,401-03 (1993);
Philippe Bourgois, In Search of Horatio Alger. Culture and Ideology in the Crack Economy,
16 CoNTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 619, 643-45 (1989); Anne Campbell, Female Participation in
Gangs, in GANGS IN AMRICA 163, 166-77 (Ronald Huff ed. 1990); Michelle Cooley-
Quille et al., Emotional Impact of Children's Exposure to Community Violene A Preliminay
Study, 34J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCIATRY 1362, 1362-63 (1995); Richard
Dembo et al., The Relationship Between Cocaine Use, Drug Sales, and Other Delinquency
Among a Cohort of High-Risk Youths Over Time, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: CAUSES,
CORRELATES, AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 3, at 112-35; Malcolm W. Klein, Offence
Specialisation and Versatility Among Juveniles, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 192 (1984);
Clyde B. McCoy et al., Youth Opiate Use, in YOUTH OPIATE USE: PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND
TRETMENT 353, 358 (George M. Beshner & A.S. Friedman eds., 1979); Wayne S.
Wooden, Tagger Crews and Members of the Posse, in THE MODERN GANG READER 67-68
(Malcolm W. Klein et al., eds. 1995); Eloise Dunlap & Bruce D. Johnson, Who They
Are and What They Do: Female Crack Dealers in New York City, Paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, New Orleans 2 (Sept.
14, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Journal of Criminal Law & Crimi-
nology).
See, e.g., JAMES A. FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OFJUVENnE OFFENDING 1-3
(1996); MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., FROM BOY TO MAN, FROM DELINQUENCY TO CRIME
195-202 (1987); Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the ilicit Drug Trade, 86J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19, 19-20 (1995).
' Mike Collison, In Search of the High Life: Drugs, Crime, Masculinities and Consump-
tion, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 428, 441 (1996); cf ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNrIY AND
SELF-IDENTTY 152-53 (1991); DANIEL MILLER, CAPrrAuSM: AN ETHNOGRAPI-C
APPROACH 224-26 (1997).
9 BENNETt ET AL., supra note 3, at 25.
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maintained that the "concentration effect" of living in inner city
environments greatly increased the likelihood of using violence
to resolve disputes and that exposure to "deviant models" char-
acteristic of inner city life invariably led to greater drug abuse,
violence, alienation and apathy.'0 As Sullivan notes, however,
very little research has been done on the impact of growing up
in a violent environment and how it may contribute to greater
or less violent behavior as an adolescent and later in life."
Clearly, social and/or environmental factors shape developmen-
tal trajectories, but increasingly, researchers are interested in
what people do and the choices they make within the parame-
ters that bound their everyday lives. Ethnographic research has
shown that people, even drug users, 2 have agency and possess
the capacity to intervene meaningfully in their own lives, though
not always in ways that they intend. 3 Young people, in particu-
lar, are noted, on one hand, for their malleability and capacity
to adapt in novel ways to their environment, but they have also
been recognized as possessing the ability to alter the status
14quo.
While the inner cities of many large metropolitan areas in
the United States have experienced severe social and economic
problems since at least the 1960s, case studies and comparative
"See, e.g., WILIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC PoLICY 58-62 (1987); Thomas J. Bernard, Angry Aggression
Among the "Truly Disadvantaged," 28 CRIMINOLOGY 73, 87-88 (1990); Bruce P. Dohren-
wend et al., Socioeconomic Status and Psychiatric Disorders. The Causation-Selection Issue,
255 Sci. 946, 946-47 (1992); Kevin Fitzpatrick & Janet Boldizar, The Prevalence and
Consequences of Exposure to Violence Among African-American Youth, 32J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 424, 424-25 (1993); Joy Osofsky, The Effects of Exposure to
Violence on Young Children, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 782, 783 (1995); Carmen N. Velez &
Jane A. Ungemack, Drug Use Among Puerto Rican Youth: An Exploration of Generational
Status Differences, 29 Soc. ScI. & MED. 779, 781 (1989).
1 Mercer Sullivan, Violence in Early Adolescence: Events and Development, paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago,
Ill. 5 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology).
' Samuel R. Friedman et al., Community Development as a Response to HIVamongDrug
Injectors, 7 AIDS 92/93-A YEAR IN REVIEW s263, s267 (Supp. 1, 1993).
" See, e.g., LISA MAHER, SEXED WORK: GENDER, RACE AND RESISTANCE IN A BROOKLYN
DRUG MARKET 201 (1997); PAUL E. WLIS, LEARNING TO LABOUR: How WORmNG CLASS
KIDS GET WORKRING CLASSJOBS 171-79 (1977).
4 See, eg, DAVID FARBER, CICAGO 68, at 218-19 (1988).
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analyses-cornerstones of anthropological inquiry-have shown
remarkable variation between cities and neighborhoods that are
divided by race/ethnicity, class, immigrant status, housing pat-
terns, crime, violence, employment opportunities, and many
other factors, including the prevalence and tolerance of drug
use and distribution.5 I examine neighborhoods and commu-
nities because they are, in addition to family contexts, where
people learn to be human. They form the crucible where orien-
tations, outlooks, behaviors, and lifestyles are forged.16 To un-
derstand neighborhood variation, as the substantivist school of
economic anthropology insists, 17 economic behavior, indeed all
behavior, must be situated in a local community which renders
it intelligible. As Sullivan has pointed out with respect to crime,
including drug dealing:
Criminal economic activity is embedded in community'context to a
far greater extent than other kinds of economic activity. The risks of
regular business activity depend primarily on markets and competition.
The risks of criminal activity depend on these factors and on the relative
positions of victims and offenders in the community.1
8
To understand how and why inner city life has changed in
the 1990s and the relationship between drugs, crime, violence
and youth development, it is helpful to examine specific exam-
ples. This paper, which focuses on two Brooklyn, New York,
neighborhoods, seeks to add to our understanding of the local-
level processes which contributed to the remarkable transforma-
tion of the inner city in the 1990s. Examining the lives of dif-
'5 See e.g., Bourgois, supra note 6, at 619-46; Thomas Mieczkowski, Geeking Up and
Throwing Down: Heroin Street Life in Detroit, 24 CRimNoLOGY 645, 645-64 (1986); see also
MAHER, supra note 13, at 83-87; MERCER SULLIVAN, GETTING PAID: YOUTH CRIME AN
WORK IN THE INNER CITY 3-8 (1989); see generally PATRICI A. ADLER, WHEELING AND
DEALING: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AN UPPER LEVEL DRUG DEALING AND SMUGGLING
COMMUNITY (1985); JoAN MOORE, HOMEBOYS (1978); TERRY WnuIAms, THE COCAINE
KIDS: THE INSIDE STORY OFATEENAGE DRUG RING (1989).
16 Cf CONRAD M. ARENSBERG & SOLON T. KIMBALL, CULTURE AND COmMUNITY 28-34
(1965).
17 See, e.g., George Dalton, Theoretical Issues' in Economic Anthropology, 10 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 63, 63-65 (1969); Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in
TRADE AND MARKET I EARLYEMPIRES 243, 243-50 (Karl Polyani, et al., eds. 1957).
18 SULLIVAN, supra note 15, at 108.
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ferent groups of young people-a household sample, gang
members, and drug dealers-will show that the urge to invest
explanatory power in structural (e.g., demographic, economic)
or institutional (e.g., police, courts) factors to explain the turn-
around witnessed in inner city neighborhoods, especially
plummeting crime rates, is tempered by a close examination of
the lives of people who live there, the very people who have
agency and must ultimately decide whether to use a drug, pick a
fight, or commit a crime.
II. METHODS
This study is based upon ten years (1987-1997) of ethno-
graphic fieldwork spanning nine different research projects
conducted in several Brooklyn neighborhoods.' 9 Though each
of these projects focused on different topics and/or popula-
tions-for example, social networks among injecting drug users,
crack markets, or the risk behaviors of local youth-the one en-
during feature of each project was an attempt to situate the ob-
served behavior of research subjects in the context of a wider
community. As such, neighborhoods as a whole were examined,
and the direct observation and analysis of behaviors and prac-
tices at both the individual and group level were thus able to be
placed in the context of a community which gave them mean-
ing. Research participants were observed in public and private
domains, allowing for descriptions of the intimate, mundane or
extraordinary details of their everyday lives, the social contexts
which framed them, and the manner by which they comported
themselves and constructed identities.
'9 These projects include: Community AIDS Prevention Outreach Demonstration
(National Institute on Drug Abuse #DA06723), The Community Effects of Street-
Level Narcotics Enforcement: A Study of the New York City Police Department's Tac-
tical Narcotics Teams (National Institute ofJustice), The Ecology of Crime and Drug
Use in American Cities: Social Structure and Neighborhood Dynamics (Social Sci-
ence Research Council), Social Factors and HIV Risk (NIDA #DA 06723), HIV Risk
Among Youth (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases #A134723), Latin
Kings and Gang Violence (Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation), The Natural His-
tory of Crack Distribution (NIDA #DA05126-05), Drug Use and HIV Risk Among
Youth (NIDA #DA10411), and Heroin in the 21st Century (NIDA #DA10105-02).
Due to the nature of this research, pseudonyms have been assigned to the sources
quoted, to protect anonymity as promised.
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For example, in one project,20 hundreds of hours were spent
observing injecting drug users (IDUs) in local settings where
they interacted with each other. This included extended obser-
vations in shooting galleries, crack houses, shanties, shacks,
street corner hangouts, abandoned buildings, vacant lots, roof-
tops, cars, trucks, public parks, fast food restaurants, and apart-
ments. Many hours were spent observing injection events and
discussing the procedures and protocols surrounding those
events with individuals and groups. Observations were also
made of the interactions between IDUs and drug distributors,
family members, neighborhood residents, and various types of
law enforcement personnel, including beat officers, members of
the Tactical Narcotics Team (TNT), and the Warrant Squad.
After three years of ethnographic fieldwork, several hundred
pages of observational notes had been written and more than
210 open-ended interviews with drug users in the neighborhood
were conducted. In addition, formal interviews with 767 IDUs
were completed in the project's storefront. Ethnographic inter-
views were designed to elicit information on a wide range of
topics including demographics, childhood and family back-
ground, education and work history, drug use history, current
drug use, social networks, knowledge of distribution and sales,
income generation and expenditures, participation in criminal
activity, impact of law enforcement, injecting practices, knowl-
edge of HIV and other blood-borne viruses, and experiences of
treatment and/or quitting.
Ethnography allows for the combination of different data
sources and permits information to be cross-validated and tar-
geted for follow up and/or clarification. For this research, the
combination of data from several studies provided widely diver-
gent outlooks and orientations toward such topics as crime, vio-
lence, and drugs, and helped strengthen the process of
triangulation between individuals and groups. Space does not
permit a review of each of the research projects which contrib-
uted to this paper, however, hopefully what has emerged from
2' Social Factors and HIV Risk (NIDA # 06723).
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this synthesis is a more sophisticated understanding of the peo-
ple who have so remarkably changed their lives.
III. DRUGS AND INNER CrIY DETERIORATION
For many Americans, drug use by inner-city residents was
responsible for the demise of once proud cities. Drugs, they
said, devastated neighborhoods as swiftly and certainly as a
wrecking ball and, in their wake, entire swaths of cities resem-
bled Dresden after the war. Drugs were also seen as a conta-
gious virus which eroded the flesh of communities and turned
domestic and communal spaces meant for sociability and rec-
reation into danger zones which needed to be quarantined
from uninfected areas.21 Parks were transformed into drug ba-
zaars rendering them unsuitable for children. Mothers feared
pushing baby carriages along streets resembling Sarejevo's
"sniper alley" where even the police would not drive. Local
businesses were systematically driven out by mounting losses as
goods mysteriously flew off shelves and landed on street corners.
Others were co-opted by nefarious druglords who callously in-
verted once-legitimate enterprises into thinly-disguised shelters
for drug profits, personnel, and product. Hearty entrepreneurs
who attempted to defy the trend invested heavily in bulletproof
glass, video cameras, industrial-strength locks, vicious dogs, and
private security guards, but still found themselves losing the bat-
tle against thugs who encircled the neighborhood to intimidate
customers and choke off commerce. Drugs were also said to
deplete a neighborhood's human capital by ruining once-
promising lives and forcing productive members of the com-
munity to move elsewhere. As the social life of neighborhoods
visibly constricted, public services also withered: garbage piled
up uncollected as side streets became dumping grounds, fire-
houses were closed as beleaguered firefighters conceded to the
arsonists and drug vultures who scavenged over the bones of
21 See, Jonathan Crane, Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and Teenage
Childbearing, in THE URBAN UNDERcLASS 299, 318-19 (ChristopherJencks & Paul E. Pe-
terson eds., 1991); Adele Harrell & Paul E. Peterson, Introduction: Inner-City Isolation
and Opportunity, to DRUGS, CRIME AND SOCIAL ISOLATION: BARRiERS TO URBAN
OePoRTuNrTY 7 (Adele Harrell & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1992).
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abandoned buildings, public transportation lines were cut back
as fewer people had reason to come to or leave the neighbor-
hood, taxi sightings became as rare as spotting a bald eagle,
ambulances careened through the potholed streets but traveled
long distances further endangering lives, schools were neglected
causing the staff to become demoralized and the children to fall
further behind developmental milestones, after-school pro-
grams were curtailed, libraries fell into disrepair, and pools,
basketball courts, and other recreational facilities were trans-
formed into fortresses which did little to insulate residents from
the encroaching urban jungle. Replacing these hallmarks of
community viability and vitality were institutions which fed the
ultra-violent, cancerous drug culture that spread like wildfire,
consuming inner cities throughout the United States and, in-
creasingly, in urban centers around the globe.
This focus on drugs as the root of the problem plaguing cit-
ies was a new, more clever variation on a decades-old theme of
blaming the decline of aging industrial centers on newly arrived
minority populations.22 In the older version, the afflictions and
miseries associated with inner-city life were said to be the out-
come of a "culture of poverty" or a "deviant subculture" in
which poor people sought out, enjoyed, and perpetuated de-
structive lifestyles.2 The new, less overtly racist variation on this
theme-that drugs and the weak-willed racial/ethnic minorities
who cannot resist them are responsible for the decline of cit-
ies-is a conviction which the crack discourse planted deeply in
the American consciousness during the 1980s. It exempted the
socioeconomic mainstream from responsibility for multiple in-
ner-city crises. Within the social sciences, variations on the "de-
viant subculture" theme sealed off the inner-city drug economy
Susan D. Greenbaum, Housing Abandonment in Inner-City Black Neighborhoods. A
Case Study of the Effects of the Dual Housing Market, in THE CULTURAL MEANING OF URBAN
SPACE 139, 140 (Robert Rotenberg & Gary McDonogh eds., 1993).
See, e.g., EDWARD C. BANEM, THE UNHEAVENLY Cry: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
OUR URBAN CRisis 53-54 (1970); GERALD SUrTES, SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM:
ETHNIClTY AND TERIUTORY IN THE INNER-CrIy 3-12 (1968); Oscar Lewis, The Culture of
Poverty, 215 Sc. AM. 19, 21 (1966); see generally DOUcLAS G. GLASCOW, THE BLACK
UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ENTRAPMENT OF GHETTo YouTH (1980).
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as if it were in a virtual vacuum, impervious to all forces from
the surrounding local, national, and global economies. In this
school of thought, such an environment produced "superpreda-
tors" who grew up surrounded by "deviant, delinquent, and
criminal adults in a practically perfect criminogenic environ-
ment-that is, an environment that seems almost consciously
designed to produce vicious, unrepentant predatory street
criminals., 24 Even some drug researchers who make reference
to the role of larger structural forces in recent urban decline
rely uncritically upon the analytically specious idea of a "crimi-
nal underclass."'' At its most extreme, this ideology of individ-
ual blame revived long-discredited theories of "genetic
predisposition" as the cause of criminal activity.
26
Contrasting with those who blame the deterioration of the
inner cities on the attitudes and norms of newly arrived minor-
ity populations or as a consequence of the drugs they used, an-
other school of social scientists convincingly showed that
structural factors played a decisive role in the degradation of
inner city neighborhoods.27 To these scholars, the destruction
had far more do with the absence of legitimate employment
opportunities than with the presence of hard drugs. The major
"destroyers" were those who, following the age-old pursuit of
profit maximization and capital accumulation, made economic
and political decisions in boardrooms and bedrooms far away
from the inner city. The decline of the cities in the Northeast
was the result of the regional de-industrialization of the 1960s,
when manufacturing capital fled and relocated in the non-
unionized South and West of the country, before moving on to
2' BENNETT ETAL., supra note 3, at 14.
2'Johnson et al., supra note 3, at 10-11.
21 JAMES Q. WILSON & RIcHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 90-103
(1985); David C. Rowe & D. Wayne Osgood, Heredity and Sociological Theories of Delin-
quency: A Reconsideration, 49 AM. SOC. REv. 526, 537-38 (1984).
27 See, e.g., SASKEIA SASSEN-KOOB, TIE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPIrAL: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLow 17-24 (1988); John D. Kasarda, The Se-
verely Distressed in Economically Transforming Cities, in DRUGS, CRIME AND SOCIAL
ISOLATION: BARRIERS TO URBAN OPPORTUNiY, supra note 21 at 65-74; Paul E. Peterson,
The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 21,
at 3, 15-25; Wallace & Wallace, supra note 3, at 13, 13-18. Cf ALEJANDRO PORTES, THE
NEW SECOND GENERATION 5 (1996).
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Central and South America and the Pacific Rim." Most of the
loss of manufacturing jobs and the subsequent increase of inner
city poverty was concentrated in four Northern "frostbelt" cities:
New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Detroit.2' Kasarda notes
that "between 1967 and 1987, Chicago lost 60 percent of its
manufacturing jobs, Detroit 51%, New York City 58%, and
Philadelphia 64%."30 The conjoined effect of these structural
forces over three decades had affected the availability of hous-
ing, real estate values, and money flows, producing the neigh-
borhood contexts for the sorts of drug-using and drug-selling
markets found in inner-city neighborhoods, each of which was
accompanied by a different set of psychosocial outcomes.31
These studies demonstrated that the destructive behavior of in-
ner-city residents did not simply result from their use of illegal
drugs, but originated in social-structural conditions.
Explanations which draw attention to the structural condi-
tions underlying urban decay are an important corrective to
those which interpret the problem as one of "deviant" norms,
attitudes, or lifestyles, but a macrostructural perspective suffers
from at least two weaknesses: (1) it has difficulty accounting for
neighborhood variation, and (2) people are afforded little
agency in such formulations; they are seen as simply reacting in
predictable ways to their misfortunes. With the exception of
neighborhoods that are gentrifying,' the structuralist's portrayal
of the conditions that serve to undermine inner-city life is un-
flinchingly bleak, and the expectation is that social conditions
' See, e.g., Kasarda, supra note 27, at 71; LESTER C. THUROW, THE FUTURE OF
CAPITALISM: How TODAYS ECONOMIC FORCES SHAPE TOMoRROW'S WORLD 124-25, 194-
210 (1996); ROBERT J.S. ROSS & KENT TRACaTE, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE NEW
LEVIATHAN 91-92 (1990).
2Harrell & Peterson, supra note 21, at 5.
-" Kasarda, supra note 27, at 71.
3tJeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income in Distressed Neighborhoods: The Economic
Lives of Street-Level Drug Users and Dealers, in DRUGS, CRIME AND SOCIAL ISOLATION:
BARRIERS TO URBAN OPPORTUNrrY, supra note 21, at 99, 103; cf. SULLIVAN, supra note
15, at 214-15.
2 J. David Greenstone, Culture, Rationality, and the Underclass, in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS, supra note 21, at 399, 403.
" See generally Peter Marcuse, Abandonment, Gentrification, and Displacement The




will follow suit. To adherents of this school of thought, the cur-
rent drop in crime and drug use defies the logic of their model;
they cannot adequately explain it. And yet, crime and hard
drug use continued to decline, and, as of the end of 1997, had
not bottomed out.'4
IV. NORTHEAST BROOKLYN IN TRANSITION
In the early 1960s, many New York City neighborhoods ex-
perienced a radical transformation which originated in the pe-
riod's restructuring of global, national, and regional socio-
economic arrangements. 5 Neighborhoods which had once
been populated by European-Americans were rapidly evacuated
and repopulated by migrants from Latin America and the Car-
ibbean, where U.S.-directed development programs had trans-
formed indigenous economies, causing malintegration between
economic sectors, unemployment, and new waves of migration.6
But as European-Americans deserted the city, over 500,000
manufacturing jobs also fled the city, and as the city's tax base
shrank, expenditure on public services was sharply reduced .
Although a few large manufacturers remained, the typical poor-
neighborhood company in the 1980s and 1990s intermittently
employed workers in non-union, low-skill, low-wage, and high-
risk jobs. The economy had stopped guaranteeing economic
prosperity and security and instead offered high unemployment
and underemployment. Thus, a significant proportion of new
immigrants arriving in U.S. cities were trapped in steadily dete-
riorating neighborhoods by unemployment and the lack of low-
income housing.
" Fox Butterfield, Reason for Dramatic Drop in Crime Puzzles the Experts N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1998, at 16.
"5 See, e.g., DAVID W. MCCULLOUGH, BROOKLYN-AND How IT GOT THAT WAY 217-19
(1983); Ross & TRACHTE, supra note 28, at 157-69; cf HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND
MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY 24-39 (1974).
6 See, e.g., Joanne Koslofsky, Migration's Motor: Postwar Modernization, in DRUGS AND
DRUG ABUSE: A READER 151, 152 (Ansley Hamid ed. 1990); Saskia Sassen-Koob, New
York City's Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 60, 60-62 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds. 1989).
37 Kasarda, supra note 27 at 72; John H. Mollenkopf & Manuel Castells, Introduction




The changes which took place in northeast Brooklyn were,
in many ways, typical of what happened elsewhere. In Williams-
burg, reform, conservative, and orthodox Jews fled to the sub-
urbs beginning in the late 1950s, abandoning apartment
buildings on the Southside of the neighborhood.m The Italians
on the Northside entrenched themselves, fiercely clinging to
neighborhood traditions.39 Bushwick, an adjacent neighbor-
hood to the southeast, emptied out in a rash of arson-related
house fires as homeowners who could not sell attempted to col-
lect insurance monies instead. Where there were once bustling,
viable neighborhoods which thrived on stable manufacturing
jobs nearby, there were now shuttered factories and block after
block of abandoned buildings and empty lots.40 The section had
become an urban wasteland whose charred, derelict landscape
was matched by a frontier mentality where confrontation and
violence were commonly used to impose order and resolve dis-
putes.4'
The high turnover of tenants and homeowners weakened
voluntary associations, if they were not completely discontinued.
Disinvestment in schools and community depleted PTAs, clubs,
church groups, and grassroots political groupings. The infor-
mal controls which defined and protected neighborhoods were
thus slackened, opening the door for organized drug distribu-
Thomas W. Ennis, Brooklyn Walkups Rehabilitated, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1965, at
39.
" Guy Trebay, The Giglio, THE NEWYoRKER, June 4, 1990, at 78, 87; Richard Curtis
& Lisa Maher, The Origin of Highly Structured Crack Markets on the Southside of Williams-
burg, Brooklyn 8 (1995) (Unpublished manuscript prepared for publication under
contract with the Social Science Research Council and the Guggenheim Foundation
Working Group on the Ecology of Crime and Drugs, on file with The Journal of Crimi-
nal Law & Criminology).
40 Martin Gottlieb, In Bushwick, A Project Called Hope, N.Y. TIMES, August 15, 1993, at
35; Pamela Newkirk & Manuel Perez-Rivas, Fire in Their Eyes, Decay Gives Way to Despair,
N.Y. NESDAY, July 12, 1992, at 6; Alan S. Oser, The Quest for Shops Below Bushwick E4
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at E7.
41 James C. McKinley, Jr., Friendships and Fear Undermine a Will to Fight Drugs in-Brook-
lyn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at BI; Mary B.W. Tabor, The World of a Drug Bazaar,
Where Hope Has Burned Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1992, atAl; Mary B.W. Tabor, Where the
Drug Culture Rules, Neighborhood Symbolizing City, State, and National Failure, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1992, atB1.
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tion and a steadily increasing crime rate.42 The former wife of a
Puerto Rican drug distributor in Williamsburg described how,
even by the 1960s, their neighborhood lacked structure and
how the absence of formal organization among neighborhood
residents was partially compensated for by the existence of fam-
ily-based drug distribution networks:
We never had any block associations. No, not in this neighborhood.
This neighborhood wasn't together. One reason, I think, is because a lot
of these people had a son or somebody bringing in some type of [ille-
gally earned] money. Even grandmothers used to be lookouts. Whole
families used to be into selling drugs. Yeah, from the 70s on; when they
started selling drugs in the streets, they needed lookouts. It was like a
family affair."'
These nascent organizations acted as springboards to politi-
cal and/or economic power within the neighborhood. For
newly arriving minority youths, aside from family connections,
there were few enduring community ties to which they pledged
loyalty. Lacking significant economic opportunity and entering
an urban terrain where neighborhood conditions and controls
were crumbling, many newcomers found themselves pulled into
the orbit of drugs as distributors and/or users.4 Drugs and the
"fast" money circulating in drug markets proved more attractive
to them than the seemingly bankrupt ideas of previous genera-
tions which believed it possible to climb the ladder to economic
success and achieve the American dream through hard work.
A. DRUG MARKETS IN NORTHEAST BROOKLYN
An enduring theme of illegal drugs in New York City is that
although distribution has been vertically organized since the
prohibition of alcohol, control over it has shifted from one eth-
nic population to another. In northeast Brooklyn, Puerto Rican
freelance distributors and family businesses filled the vacuum
42 See Curtis & Maher, supra note 39, at 16-19; Wallace & Wallace, supra note 3, at
14-15.
" Interview with Carmela, conducted at the CAPOD Research storefront, Wil-
liamsburg, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Aug. 14, 1988).
14 Edward Preble &JohnJ. CaseyJr., Taking Care of Business: The Heroin User's Life on
the Street, 4 INT'LJ. ADDICrIONS 1, 4-5 (1969); Curtis & Maher, supra note 39, at 35.
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left by the withdrawal of Italian retailers in the early 1960s. As
the popularity of heroin skyrocketed in the mid 1960s, they
quickly cornered street-level sales in many neighborhoods and
their incipient organizations grew in size and complexity.
45
When the heroin epidemic ended in the 1970s, just a few Puerto
Rican "owners" had consolidated the market and formed mono-
lithic enterprises which tightly integrated wholesale, mid-level,
and street-level markets. Located in selected Latino neighbor-
hoods, these businesses remained an exclusively Puerto Rican
enterprise. In Williamsburg, five Puerto Rican "owners" em-
ployed a street-level staff of exclusively Puerto Ricans. 6
When the popularity of crack skyrocketed in New York City
in the mid-1980s, the owners of heroin and cocaine businesses
in Williamsburg resisted adding crack to their menus despite in-
creasing numbers of customers who were asking for it, and only
grudgingly allowed fledgling (Dominican) crack distributors to
operate on the edge of their turfs.4 Even though crack eventu-
ally made inroads into Williamsburg in the late 1980s, the an-
tipathy which heroin and cocaine distributors, shooting gallery
operators and drug injectors held toward crack users initially
kept the crack scene on the neighborhood fringe. But by pass-
ing up the opportunity to diversify their tightly controlled mar-
ket, the owners of drug businesses in Williamsburg emboldened
competitors who eventually usurped Puerto Rican dominance
over the market.
Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s, Bushwick was
a second-tier drug market compared to Williamsburg. Located
immediately southeast of the latter and further into Brooklyn,
Bushwick is more isolated and inconvenient for drug users from
outside the neighborhood to reach via car or public transporta-
tion. In Bushwick, territory was much less rigidly controlled
than in Williamsburg, and crack, cocaine and heroin distribu-
tors, many of them newly arrived Dominicans, were able to
'5 See Randy Young Paul, Where the Drugs Are, SOHO WEEKLY NEWS, Oct. 7, 1976, at 4;
Curtis & Maher, supra note 39 at 29-33; see generally Preble & Casey, supra note 44, at 8-
14 (explaining the complexity of heroin distribution in New York City).
46 Curtis & Maher, supra note 39, at 38-39.
7 Id. at 47.
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make significant inroads into the neighborhood in the late
1980s. 8 By 1988, fueled by aggressive crack sales and offering
an entire range of street-level drugs to consumers, drug markets
in Bushwick began to rival those in Williamsburg.49 Still, their
location was bad and many drug users continued to utilize
Bushwick as a secondary market, a place they would go only
when drugs could not be found elsewhere. But if Bushwick's lo-
cation was inconvenient, Williamsburg's was good, too good. In
the mid-1980s, gentrification in lower Manhattan began to drive
many young artists and professionals to the outer boroughs and
Williamsburg became an increasingly attractive option to many
of them.0 A housing shortage in Williamsburg, which was al-
ready bad given rapidly expanding Latino and Hasidic commu-
nities,5 1 was thus exacerbated by an influx of Manhattanites.
Suddenly, buildings which had been abandoned since the early
1970s and were the sites of shooting galleries and hideouts for
drug dealers were valuable property. They were sealed up,
cleaned up, and completely transformed within the space of a
few years. Many factory buildings near the waterfront, especially
those with a view of Manhattan, were turned into lofts and sold
for handsome profits. Apartment buildings were rehabilitated
and rented out to local low- and middle-income families who
waged spirited battles to gain entry.
For Bushwick, the citywide blackout of August 1977, when
many businesses and homes were burned, represented a low
point. Throughout the 1980s, like Williamsburg, Bushwick too
began to experience renewal, though much more modest in52
scope. Small industries reclaimed many vacant factories and
New York City, in partnership with landlords, slowly began to
"' See Lisa Maher & Richard Curtis, In Search of the Female Gangsta, in THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN: OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND WORKERS 147, 154-55 (Barbara
Raffel Price & NatalieJ. Sokoloffeds., 1982).
4 
Id. at 155.
'0 Lisa W. Foderaro, A Metamorphosis for Old Williamsburg, N.Y. TIn,July 19, 1987.
" See Martin Gansberg, Williamsburg Violence Reflects Tension in Area, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1970, at 45; Margot Hornblower, Cultures Clash, LIBERTY, Mar./Apr. 1988, at
23, 23-25; Edmund Newton, Tension in Williamsburg-Housing for Whom?, N.Y. DAIIY
POST MAG., Dec. 22, 1976, at 27.
12 Oser, supra note 40, at E7.
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rehabilitate some of the apartment buildings which had gone
untended for many years. But when Williamsburg began to
gentrify and the Tactical Narcotics Team cracked down on
street-level drug markets there, the drug markets were displaced
to Bushwick.5 3 Robert, a forty-one-year-old African-American
from Newark, NJ, discussed his reasons for coming to Bushwick
in 1990:
I started copping at Alphabet City [Manhattan's Lower East Side].
When [Operation] Pressure Point started [in 1983-84], the boys told me
things had moved over to Williamsburg, South Second Street. Then they
cracked down over there and unless you actually know someone or
something like that, because of the new housing, the place is virtually
cleaned except for a few bodegas up and down Broadway that you can
buy cocaine from, and stuff like that. So then that whole scene closed
down and I started coming down here."
Thus, the modest recovery mounted by Bushwick was
promptly stalled by a steady increase in the amount of street-
level crack, heroin, and cocaine trafficking which drew partici-
pants from throughout the New York metropolitan area.5 By
1990, a street-level drug "supermarket" had formed in the
northern tier of Bushwick and within a four block area, more
than two dozen different "stamps" of heroin were aggressively
hawked by street-level sellers who called out the name of their
product like Coney Island carnival barkers. Between February
1991 and May 1992, the number of distributors and users at the
largest street-level market in Bushwick doubled.-5
The police, and Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) in particu-
lar, enjoyed a great benefit from the contraction and concentra-
tion of street-level cocaine (crack) markets throughout New
York City. They were able to focus their efforts on fewer pre-
5" Richard Curtis & Michelle Sviridoff, The Social Organization of Street-Level Drug
Markets and Its Impact on the Displacement Effec, in CRIME DISPLACEMENT: THE OTHER
SIDE OF PREVENTION 155, 160 (Robert P. McNamara ed., 1994).
" Interview with Robert, a heroin injector, conducted at the SFHR research store-
front (May 31, 1991).
" Richard Curtis et al., Street Level Drug Markets- Network Structure and HV Risk, 17
Soc. NETWORKS 229, 231-32 (1995).
6 Id. at 231.
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cincts and still maintain the same high number of arrests (about
400 per month per unit) previously achieved within a much
larger geographical area. For example, over 8,200 persons were
arrested between 1988 and 1992 in Bushwick alone. A common
joke was that Rikers Island, the city jail, had turned into "a
Bushwick block party' 57 where young women and children sat in
the waiting room exchanging gossip about recent arrests, sen-
tences received, and mounting family pressures, while young
men gathered on the other side of the bars in anticipation of
visits by family and friends.
The citywide conversion of more decentralized drug mar-
kets into a few supermarkets in Bushwick, East Harlem, and a
few other neighborhoods also precipitated greater tumult.
Drug distributors have long commanded attention58 for their
unprecedented levels of and novel approaches to violence, in-
cluding the infamous "Colombian necktie," the use of boxcut-
ters to slash faces, and their promotion of the 9mm pistol to the
status of cultural icon. Goldstein has noted that "systemic" vio-
lence accounts for the lion's share of incidents related to illegal
drugs, 9 and nowhere was that more apparent than in Bushwick.
While some markets earned reputations for controlling violence
(e.g., Hamid's marijuana distributors6° and Williams' crack deal-
ers61), distributors in Bushwick employed it regularly and sys-
tematically.62 There, large corporate-like organizations effected
17 Richard Curtis & Ansley Hamid, Neighborhood Violence in New York City and Indige-
nous Attempts to Contain It: The Mediating Role of the Third Crown (Sgt. at Arms) of the Latin
Kings, in INTEGRATING CULTURAL, OBSERVATIONAL, AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL APPROACHES
IN THE PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE AND HIV/AIDS: CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS
(National Institute on Drug Abuse ed., forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 5, on file
with The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology).
See Paul J. Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework,
15J. DRUG ISSUES 493, 497-502 (1985); see generally Ansley Hamid, From Ganja to Crack:
Caribbean Participation in the Underground Economy in Brooklyn, 19761986, Part 2: Estab-
lishment of the Cocaine (and Crack) Economy, 26 INT'LJ. ADDICTIONS 729 (1991).
Goldstein, supra note 58, at 503.
o Hamid, supra note 57, at 729.
6' WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 14-16.
62 See MAHER, supra note 13 at 94-95; Lisa Maher & Richard Curtis, Women on the
Edge of Crime. Crack Cocaine and the Changing Contexts of Street-Level Sex Work in New York




street-level drug sales, and since institutional and neighbor-
hood-level restraints had already vanished, they completely dis-
regarded the sensibilities of residents in doing so. They also
undermined the prosperity of the community which hosted
them, just as their counterparts in the formal economy had
done. While their sole benefit consisted of low-level, dead-end
jobs for youths, the damages included plummeting property
values, a greater incidence of drug misuse, and high rates of in-
carceration and AIDS. But their most crippling legacy was vio-
lence. As one college student from the neighborhood wrote in
1991, "Nights here are like the Fourth of July, but all year
round. There are always guns being fired."'  Another noted
that there were few public places that were safe any longer:
It was the summer of 1989 and I was together with my best friend
from high school, Julio, and we were going to the park to play some ball
and catch up on old times. All of a sudden we heard gun shots from an
Uzi machine gun. I yelled, "get down," and took cover behind a tree.
My friend, on the other hand, panicked and ran. I couldn't believe that
I was witnessing an actual drug war over territory in my neighborhood. I
was shocked and amazed. I wondered where and how my friend was do-
ing. I looked and saw him lying on the ground, bleeding from his left
leg. The whole thing must have lasted only a few minutes, but it seemed
like forever. Today, I can no longer go to the park where I used to run
track and field for fear of such episodes. I either drive to another track
or just run through the neighborhood in the early morning, which can
also be dangerous."
B. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTORS AND THE LEGACY OF VIOLENCE
By 1992, one Puerto Rican and three Dominican "owners"
ruled over crack distribution at the northern end of Bushwick.
Each had a trademark, or the color of the "tops" of the crack vi-
als they sold: white, blue, brown and pink. Dominican families
monitored the day to day operations of the largest three.
Younger family members and close non-kin "associates" directed
street sales, while older family members, entirely removed from
63 Jose (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscripts, on file with author).
"Orlando (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); [Editor's
note: Both authors were students at John Jay College, who were writing about drugs
in their neighborhoods, which for each was Bushwick, New York. Professor Curtis
promised both students anonymity in their papers.]
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the street scene, were the "executives." When there were not
enough family members, owners employed persons who shared
a similar background. The practice earned them the resent-
ment of street-level workers, particularly among the Puerto Ri-
cans who had controlled distribution throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s (and had similar policies), but were later toppled by
the Dominicans in the late 1980s. The rivalry which had long
existed between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in New York
City was thus sharpened in the drug business:
The Puerto Ricans and Dominicans are pretty separate. They got
their own clubs, you know, their own crew. Some of them socialize, you
know.., people that are not in the drug business. They might work to-
gether in the same factory, same jobs. Some I could say they're tight.
But when it comes to the drug business, they're not tight, you know.
There's no trust whatsoever, you know; and it's always remorse and al-
ways backbitin' and they're always tryin' to get over on each other.'
The supply of eligible Latino street-level dealers was de-
pleted by arrests resulting from the war on drugs. African-
Americans, European-Americans and heavy drug users, who
were marginalized and victimized even more severely by these
organizations, replaced them.6 The gulf separating manage-
ment from labor widened and their already contentious and ad-
versarial relationships turned even more distrustful and
violence-prone. Resenting their harsh and dangerous condi-
tions of labor, and the disrespect their managers showed, many
street-level sellers took every opportunity to abscond with the
drugs. They fully expected physical punishment for the trans-
gression.
I haven't been down here recently because well, 'cause I ain't got
they money yet. And the last guy I seen that had got busted, or jetted, or
whatever, he came back months later and he didn't have the money, and
I seen them bat him down. They broke his ribs, they broke his lungs.'
6' Interview with Henry, Puerto Rican heroin seller, at the SFHR storefront in
Bushwick, N.Y. (Mar. 20, 1992).
" Maher & Curtis, supra note 62, at 156.
67 Interview with Doc, an African-American heroin seller, at the SFHR storefront in
Bushwick, N.Y. (Mar. 26, 1992).
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If they catch the people that are cuttin' out with their product they
either make them work for nothing or they'll break their arm, or break
their leg. Forget it, man. They hurt ... they get a beating. They break
their legs or an arm. But now if anyone hits you, they all hit you. They
all hit you.'
While brute force, or the threat of it, is the ultimate means
distributors have to enforce rules, a business is ruined when it
invites police attention too frequently. Accordingly, sensible or
successful distributors avoided or minimized its use. But Bush-
wick's corporate "owners" were reckless. Violent acts were more
common in their markets because of the divisions and animosi-
ties that rigidly separated different levels of the organizations,
because the owners did not live in the neighborhood and did
not have to witness or confront the aftermath of their deeds,
and because they could easily relocate supplies to outlets they
maintained in other neighborhoods. Indeed, owners regularly
encouraged their managers to use public displays of force as a
way of intimidating customers, untrustworthy employees, and to
send the message that they should not be crossed. For example,
one owner hired an "enforcer" who strolled around the neigh-
borhood with a baseball bat on which he wrote the names of his
targets. After punishing them, he rubbed off their names.
In the Bushwick of the early 1990s, "face to face" or "man to
man" confrontations between individuals were replaced by hu-
miliating group beatings, or "beatdowns." Their unrestrained
brutality affected local adolescents, who were its daily witnesses.
Sometimes they too participated gratuitously in beatdowns and
other bloody episodes in which they had no stake. They simply
saw someone being chased and, with malicious smiles on their
faces, picked up their baseball bats or bicycle chains and joined
the chase. For them, "fun" was no longer spraying graffiti, play-
ing ball, or dancing, it was the number and severity of beat-
downs they administered daily, and the beatdowns became so
frequent that the sight of blood stopped being a cause for alarm
to researchers and local residents alike:
Gs Interview with Jose, a Puerto Rican heroin seller, at the SFHR storefront in
Bushwick, N.Y. (Jan. 21, 1992).
1998] 1253
RICHARD CURTIS
Looking out the storefront's picture window, I saw my old neighbor,
George, this morning. He was all beaten up and his nose was all bloody.
He said that some "dope fiends" had jumped him this morning and tried
to take his money. I don't know whether this is true or not, but sus-
pected that he might have been the one who tried to take someone's
money. He came inside the storefront and wiped his face off with some
paper towels. We hadn't seen him for several months, at least since New
Year's. He said that today was the first time that he had come down here
in a couple of months. So I asked him what he's selling out here today.
He said he was going to be selling "brown tops" [crack]. Apparently,
brown tops is an organization where somebody can just show up on their
door step all beaten up and say, "yo, I want to sell for you today," and
they will put him out there on the street, bloody nose and all.69
Drug supermarkets made these atrocities an unremarkable
commonplace feature of everyday life. While police operations
which target street-level drug markets may anticipate the use of
force as people resist being arrested or during their attempts to
flee, some members of the New York City Police Department
were innovative, and conceived many unusual applications
which deeply alienated neighborhood residents. For example,
when "sweeping" the main drug selling areas, the officers would
cordon off both ends of a street and require everyone in be-
tween to lie down, regardless of who they were. While this tactic
sometimes yielded a handsome number of arrests, it also
obliged elderly grandmothers and young children to grovel on
the asphalt while being roughly searched-and it enraged many
residents.
When the police could not find drug distributors to arrest,
they went to well-known shooting galleries. But officers loathed
going into them. They believed that too many hiding places
lurked in the dark and sometimes labyrinthine constructions
and that they were an obstacle course of discarded HIV-infected
syringes. Instead, to flush the drug users out, some officers used
to throw large rocks through the windows. They were caught in
the act by a prize-winning reporter for the Los Angeles Times,
who had been interviewing heroin injectors when the projectiles




whizzed by his head.70  Drug users also showed the research
team large welts across their torsos which officers had inflicted
with whips of thick television cable as they fled the galleries.
In the summer, local police officers mercilessly and system-
atically harassed drug users who loitered near the major drug
selling locales. Early in the morning when they had fallen
asleep on the sidewalk, foot patrol officers would routinely
rouse them with kicks and order them to move. Sometimes the
kick simply nudged the unfortunate awake, at other times it was
meant to cause pain. So habituated were they to the past-time
that the police officers continued it even when video cameras
were brought to photograph them. They also responded with
an overwhelming show of force at almost any infraction by a
drug user, dealer, or passerby.
A young Latino, about 25 or 30 years old and weighing about 120
pounds, was being arrested by two officers. They had him in a choke
hold and he started bleeding through his nose. I informed the police of-
ficer that the guy was bleeding through his nose and he couldn't
breathe. His reaction to me was, "hey, I can't breathe either." As the
crowd got bigger, they started to notice the guy was bleeding through his
nose, and people were saying things [addressing insults] to the cop. He
sent some sort of message into his walkie-talkie, and within 30 seconds
there were dozens of cops on the corner. They were all there to arrest
one guy who apparently had attempted to steal a bicycle. Itjust looked
ridiculous, but the situation could have easily gotten out of control.
7
1
By late summer 1992, the populace was close to insurrection
and television and newspaper crews came to interview unruly
crowds who were protesting the mounting number of police
shootings and beatings of youths.72 Police had responded in full
riot gear, and other residents had pelted them from the roof-
tops with bottles, debris, and hateful epithets. Apparently think-
ing that beleaguered drug distributors were fomenting the
neighborhood's growing hostility towards them, and immedi-
'ately following a sensationalizing article in the New York
70Barry Bearak, A RoomforHeroin and HV, L.A.TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al.
7 Interview with Pablo, at the SFHR storefront in Bushwick, N.Y. (July 24, 1991).
72 Pamela Newkirk & WendellJamieson, Street of Fury: Shooting Riles Brooklyn Crowd,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 24, 1992, at 3.
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Times,73 the police mounted yet another major offensive against
street-level drug markets in September, 1992.74 They stationed a
mobile trailer in a nearby park to serve as the base of operations
for more than 300 additional uniformed officers. These were
positioned around the park and on each comer of drug "hot
spots." Mounted police trotted by to discourage trafficking or
"loitering." Officers stopped and questioned all pedestrians and
asked for their identification and destination. Non-residents
were told to stay out. The heaviest drug trafficking streets were
sealed with wooden barricades and police vans, and traffic was
diverted to other streets. When evening came, they drove in
large flatbed trucks with gas-powered generators and klieg lights
which, parked at strategic comers, illuminated entire blocks.
Police painted the street numbers of buildings on rooftops to
enable helicopters to give additional support to officers pursu-
ing suspects on foot. For the next 18 months, Bushwick was vir-
tually occupied by a small army of police.
V. GROWING UP IN THE 1990s: VIOLENCE, CRIME AND DRUGS
For Bushwick youth, it would not have been unreasonable
to expect that rates of crime and violence would continue to in-
crease throughout the 1990s, and that it was only a matter of
time before a new breed of superpredators made their ominous
presence felt. Much evidence seemed to suggest that the domi-
nant models of urban decay and worsening youth violence were
correct. Many youth had grown up in dysfunctional multi-
problem families, without positive role models, and were left
unchecked by the informal controls which had defined and pro-
tected previous generations. The lack of structure worsened as
youth turned into adolescents. There was typically a diffusion of
responsibility for social control shifting away from parents and
onto societal institutions, especially schools. In Bushwick, these
societal checks had been largely missing and young adults had
to forge their own solutions to problems.
73 Tabor, supra note 41.
71 See Curtis & Hamid, supra note 57, at 17-19.
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The daily occurrences of violence and crime etched deep
furrows on the bodies and psyches of Bushwick youth. A repre-
sentative household sample of Bushwick youth aged eighteen to
twenty-one conducted in 1994-95 noted the pervasiveness of vio-
lence:
Violence has been an important part of their lives: approximately
10% report having been physically abused by a police officer, 30% have
been threatened or stabbed with a knife, 27% have been caught in a
random shoot-out, 22% have been threatened or shot at with a gun, 33%
have been mugged or robbed with a threat of violence, and 14% of the
women and 5% of the men report having been sexually abused. Over
half (51%) report having carried a weapon such as a knife, club or gun.
But rather than becoming superpredators as an outcome of
this exposure, many youth withdrew from social life, afraid of
lingering in public spaces for fear of violence. Violence had be-
come so commonplace that they often listened in near disbelief
to stories about when fighting was fair, and done for reasons
that were righteous or virtuous. Walter (seventeen years old
when interviewed in 1993) discussed his reasons for avoiding
spending time on the street:
Like the stories I heard about when my uncles were growing up: if
there was a problem between two gangs, those two gangs would kill each
other. It's not like that anymore. They try to hit you.., if there's ten
people there, they're just gonna come and spray the whole block and
whoever gets caught gets caught. They're not even aiming at you,
they're just ... that's the crowd, he's in there somewhere, let's knock
everybody. It's crazy. And they don't care if there's children, older peo-
ple. They don't even respect cops anymore. They don't respect any-
body.
76
Many youth who were interviewed between 1993 and 1995
said that they were so fearful of random and/or police violence
that they no longer spent much time in parks, playgrounds,
stoops, or the other places where youths had traditionally "hung
75 Samuel R. Friedman et al., Adolescents and HIVRish Due to Drug Injection or Sex with
Drug Injectors in the United States, in AIDS AND ADOLESCENTS 107, 120 (Lorraine Sherr
ed., 1997).
7' Focus group with three teens from Bushwick, conducted at Intermediate School
After School Program (Dec. 13, 1993).
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out." Indeed, the question, "where do you hang out?" seemed
to offend them. When pushed to explain, one former cocaine
and heroin dealer on Fishman Street who had renounced his
violent past and tried to distance himself from peers who con-
tinued to commit crimes and sell drugs for corporate owners,
said that hanging out was for "hoodlums." Harv (nineteen years
old when first interviewed in 1993):
What makes one a hoodlum? It's a kid who runs around doing stu-
pid, ignorant things, like hanging out late at night, getting drunk, startin
fights, wanna do crime, steal...that's a hoodlum. Somebody who's always
in the streets and he's very streetwise. It's someone who does vandalism
like shooting in the air or breaking bottles in the street."
Javier (sixteen years old when first interviewed in 1993)
grudgingly admitted that he sometimes spent time with age-
mates who were involved with drugs, violence, and crime, but he
preferred to avoid them in favor of a more mature crowd.
Some of the people I grew up with are getting killed, like about ten
of them got killed. For me, I think I grew up ahead of time. I'm more of
an adult than anything else. OK, I hang out. I chill out now and then
with the young guys, but it's rare. Most of the time, during the week you
find me with people like thirty, mid thirties, forty years old and I'm chill-
ing with them. I feel safer, you know. I don't have to deal with what's
going on in the street. Once in a while I'll hang out with one of the fel-
las I grew up with. Maybe if I bump into him. Like if I'm walking down
the street, and I haven't seen him for a while or I'd see what he was do-
ing and I was avoiding him. Maybe I'd hang with him for a couple of
minutes, or at the most for an hour. But then, you try and draw back,
,cause you don't want to get caught up in what he's doing especially if
the police are looking for him7'
Violence and crime did not disappear overnight or entirely
from the lives of this generation of youth, but in moving away
from exposure to high-risk settings and the performance of vio-
lent acts in public spheres, the intimate contexts of private, and
especially family, life became the arena where violent episodes
Focus group with four street level drug distributors, conducted at doctor's office,
Bushwick Ave. (Nov. 18, 1993).
78 Focus group with three teens from Bushwick, conducted at an Intermediate
School After School Program (Dec. 13, 1993).
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found their expression. In the mid 1990s, social service provid-
ers throughout Bushwick reported significant increases in the
amount of domestic violence cases that had gone, for the most
part, unreported to the police and which there were precious
few community resources to handle. The director of one social
service program said that between 1995 and 1997, the number
of phone calls, referrals, and cases of domestic violence they
handled more than doubled, compelling the agency to hire a
social worker who handled only such cases. 9
Many youth had intimate experience with the variety of
problems that afflicted their elders as an outcome of involve-
ment with cocaine, crack, or heroin, and they made a conscious
attempt to avoid similar fates. Bubbler (seventeen years old in
1996), for example, had witnessed his mother's despair after
two older, heroin-using brothers who worked for the corporate
owners on Fishman Street became casualties of the war on drugs
and were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Bubbler smoked
only marijuana, and though he had intermittently sold crack in
his middle-teens, by seventeen, he had stopped selling, moved
in with his girlfriend, attended high school regularly, and
sought legitimate employment.
The impact of parental drug misuse on family life was
deeply felt by many young Bushwick residents, often narrowing
the parameters of their own drug use. Victoria (twenty-five
years old in 1997) had extensive involvement with drug distribu-
tors and users as a child and a teenager, but she remained
steadfastly abstinent, chastened by her mother's experience:
My mom used dope, crack and other drugs for many years. She
used to make deliveries for big-time dealers. One guy was Puerto Rican
and his partner was Colombian. Sometimes, she'd take dope and coke
to Puerto Rico for them. They would strap the packages to her body.
Somebody would come to the house and do it for her. She'd make these
runs for them about once a month-to San Juan-and never got caught.
I'm not sure how much money she made each time, but once, I know,
" Personal communication with Jose Olmo, Director of Family Dynamics, at the
DUHRAY research storefront (Nov. 15, 1997). Family Dynamics, located in Bushwick,




she made $15,000. She still sniffs and shoots dope .... mostly shoots it.
She's a client of ADAPT's needle exchange."
Victoria never divulged whether her mother had contracted
HIV from her many years of injecting, but Bushwick had one of
the highest rates of HIV and AIDS in New York City"-double
the rate of the city as a whole-and the threat of contracting the
virus was never far from the minds of youth. Bolo, the owner of
a crack business in the neighborhood," shook his head in sor-
row when talking about his mother's sister who lived next door,
a forty-three year old drug injector and crack smoker who had
been diagnosed with AIDS. Macho (born in 1978), an abstinent
youth who occasionally sold crack to make money, talked about
the impact of AIDS on his life:
My mom, who's dead now, grew up on Knickerbocker Avenue in
Bushwick. She died last year [1996], on June 12th, of AIDS. My little sis-
ter's father gave it to her and she died 3 months after she was diagnosed
with the disease. He had the virus and never said anything to her. Even-
tually, she began to wonder why she was getting sick all the time and
when we found out the truth, she was shocked.
8 3
Given the AIDS epidemic, a growing body count in the war
on drugs, and the many adverse psychosocial outcomes that fol-
low drug misuse, many African American youth throughout
New York City began to avoid heroin and crack in the 1990s.
8 4
In Manhattan, for example, "the rate [of cocaine/crack use]
among youthful arrestees went from 70% in 1988 down to 31%
in 1991, where it remained through 1995. It declined further to
22% in 1996."' In place of hard drugs, they consumed only
marijuana, and viewed even cigarettes and malt liquor, which
0 Interview with Victoria, in her apartment, Bushwick, N.Y. (Feb. 16, 1997).
8I Curtis et al., supra note 55, at 230-31.
82 See infra, Part VII.
" Interview with Macho, at friend's apartment on Stanhope Street, in Bushwick
(Sept. 5, 1997).84 Ansley Hamid et al., The Heroin Epidemic in New York City. Current Status and Prog-
noses, 29J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 375, 378 (1997).
8' ANDREw L. GOLUB & BRUCE D. JOHNSON, CRACK'S DECLINE: SOME SURPRISES
ACROSS U.S. CrEs. NATIONAL INSTrTrE OFJUSTIcE: RESEARCH IN BRIEF 6 (July 1997).
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had been aggressively marketed in their neighborhoods,86 with
disfavor. This generation of youth put tremendous pressure on
their age mates to eschew stigmatized substances. 'You don't
get no respect [if you use drugs]. See, the in-thing is the weed
or drinking, but if you start messing with the dope, that's bad,
you're a crackhead now. '
Bushwick youth were nearly unanimous in their opinion
that their peers would not be proud of using heroin or crack.
When asked where people their age might be using heroin or
crack, one said, "Hiding somewhere on the down low. Probably
in the bathroom. Only the oldtimers do those things where
others can see them."" Another said that he knew only one peer
who used heroin or cocaine:
The reason I found out [a friend was using drugs] was by accident.
I'm walking in the back of the building in the dark and I just happened
to ... ooops. But now, he has to keep it on the hush-hush, you know. Its
not something that [he's] proud of.'
In a neighborhood which had become nearly resigned to
the presence of brazen street-level drug markets, successive
generations of youth who participated in them, and high rates
of HIV/AIDS, ° it initially came as a surprise when Friedman et
al discovered that less than 3% of their sample of youth said that
they had used heroin, only 9% said that they had ever used co-
caine, and none were infected with HIV, syphilis, or HTLV-2.9'
After all, most models of adolescent development had suggested
86 See Michel Marriott, For Minority Youths, 40 Ounces of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1993, at Al; Barry Meier, Among Girls, Blacks Smoke Much Less, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1997, at A22.
87 Interview with Walter, during focus group at Intermediate School, in Bushwick
(Dec. 13, 1993).
"Interview with Harv, focus group with four street level distributors, Bushwick
(Nov. 18, 1993).
89 Interview with Fila, focus group with four street level distributors, Bushwick
(Nov. 18, 1993).
BennyJose, et al., Syringe-Mediated Drug-Sharing (Backloading): A New Risk Factor for
HIVAmongInjectingDrug-Users, 7 AIDS 1653, 1655-57 (1993).
" Samual R. Friedman et al., Sex, Drugs, and Infections Among Youth. Parenterally and
Sexually Transmitted Diseases in a High-Risk Neighborhood, 24 SEXUALLY TRANSMrrrED
DIsFAsEs 322, 323-24 (1997).
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that inner-city youth were at progressively greater risk of drug
abuse and contracting pathogens like HIV.9 2 Even worse, mod-
els of the likely progression of the AIDS epidemic had predicted
that the virus would increasingly spread via heterosexual con-
tact-the province of sexually active youngsters.93  But clearly,
this generation was not using hard drugs at rates characteristic
of earlier generations. Given the low rates of HIV and other
markers of risk that were discovered, Friedman et al. concluded
that their drug use and sexual networks overlapped little with
those already infected.94 Even the handful of young people we
interviewed in Bushwick who admitted that they had used her-
oin confessed that they were terrified to try it. For example,
Boo (born in 1971, interviewed in 1997) had sniffed heroin, but
said that the drug had taken a terrible toll on her family and she
was petrified of becoming addicted:
In '95, I tried dope for the first time. I was in my mom's house. I
had recently moved back there after having broken up with an abusive
boyfriend. Anyway, I was there and feeling achey. I have a bad hip from
an accident long ago, and it was paining me on this day. A guy friend
(he was around 29) said that he had something that would take the pain
92 See, e.g., Sevgi 0. Aral et al., Demographic and Societal Factors Influencing Risk Behav-
iors, in RESEARCH ISSUES IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES IN
THE AIDS ERA 161, 162-64 (Judith N. Wasserheit et al. eds. 1991);Jonathan M. Ellen
et al., Socioeconomic Differences in Sexually Transmitted Disease Rates Among Black and White
Adolescents, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1546, 1547 (1995); Robert T. Rolfs et al., Risk Fac-
tors for Syphilis: Cocaine Use and Prostitution, 80 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 853, 855-56 (1990);
cf. Denise B. Kandel & Kazuo Yamaguchi, From Beer to Crack: Developmental Patterns of
Drug Involvement, 83 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 853, 855-56 (1990).
:"* See Nancy J. Alexander, Sexual Spread of HIV Infection, 1 J. BRIT. FERTILITY Soc'y
111, 111, supplement to 11 HUM. REPROD. (1996); Suzanne Bowler et al., HIV and AIDS
Among Adolescents in the United States- Increasing Risk in the 1990s, 15 J. ADOLESCENCE
345, 347-48 (1992); Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., CDC Update: Trends in AIDS Incidence-United States, 1996, 46 MORTALITY &
MOBIDrn' WEEKLY REV. 861, 866 (1997); Helene D. Gayle & Lawrence J. D'Angelo,
Epidemiology of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection in Adolescents, 10 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASEJ. 322, 322 (1991); Steven E.
Keller et al., HIV-Relevant Sexual Behavior Among a Healthy Inner-City Heterosexual Adoles-
cent Population in an Endemic Area of HIl, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 44, 44 (1991);
Janneke H. H. M. Van De Wijgert & Nancy S. Padian, Heterosexual Transmission of HIV,
in AIDS AND THE HETEROSEXUAL POPULATION 1 (Lorraine Sherr, ed., 1993); HeatherJ.
Walter et al., Factors Associated with AIDS Risk Behaviors Among High School Students in an
AIDS Epicenter, 82 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 528, 530-31 (1992).
'4 Friedman et al., supra note 75, at 119-20.
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away. When he told me that it was dope, I didn't want to do it because I
was afraid of becoming addicted and had seen what it did to some of my
older brothers and sisters. But he talked me into it, saying that a little bit
wouldn't get me addicted. I did a "two and two" [two sniffs up each nos-
tril] and threw up all over the place.95
The widely reported drop in crack and other hard drug use
among inner city youth in the 1990s96 was, on one hand, an out-
come of the natural progression of drug eras,97 but changes in
drug preferences coincided with and were deepened by more
fundamental changes in youth culture. Where crack in the
1980s had emptied out the inner city and left neighborhoods
and their residents looking like skeletons, the anti-crack/heroin
generation of the 1990s sought to fill out their bodies. They
visually displayed this attitude in the too-large designer clothing
they wore, and through the language of "living large" where
everything good was "phat" (fat) and "butter." Still, their style
was very much muted, devoid of the garish clothing and gaudy
accessories that characterized the crack-era "gangsta" persona.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GANGS IN THE 1990s
Rather than fulfilling the prophecy of becoming addicted
and remorseless "superpredators," the overwhelming majority of
kids who grew up in Bushwick in the late 1980s and early 1990s
responded to the multiple threats of violence, crime, AIDS and
addiction-as most Americans would likely do-by withdrawing
from the danger and opting for the relative safety of family,
home, church, and other sheltering institutions which perse-
vered during the most difficult years.98 However, not all youths
were scared into avoiding public spaces and hiding behind
closed doors. As an unintended consequence of the war on
drugs, gang life of a type never encountered before revived
among a population of convicted drug distributors and users af-
9' Interview with Boo, atJohnJay College (May 2, 1997).
GOLUB &JOHNSON, supra note 85, at 3.
See Ansley Hamid, The Development Cycle of a Drug Epidemic The Cocaine Smoking
Epidemic of 1981-1991, 24J. PsYcHoAcTivE DRUGS 337, 345 (1992); Bruce D.Johnson et
al., Emerging Models of Crack Distribution, in DRUGS CRIME AND SocIAL PoIicY 56-78
(Thomas M. Mieczkowski ed., 1992).
'Cf Friedman et al., supra note 91, at 325.
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ter a long dormancy. Following the massive police initiative that
began in September 1992 in which hundreds of neighborhood
youth were jailed, sizable chapters of the Latin Kings and Netas
formed and asserted their control over some blocks, especially
those where there had been large street-level drug markets and
unchecked violence. Predominantly of Puerto Rican descent,
they reported that they had experienced a genuine rebirth, and
in attempting to reconstitute their lives, their new goal was to
"uplift the Latino community. '" As former street-level drug
workers who had suffered at the hands of their Dominican
bosses and the police, they were disillusioned. Though they had
long realized their limitations in American society, the sweeping
arrests had also taught them the shallowness of the drug distri-
bution organizations which had employed them but had ulti-
mately harmed their families and neighborhoods. The
Dominican "owners" did not bail them out of jail, hire lawyers,
look after family, or compensate them for the time in prison.
They remained indifferent to Puerto Rican sensibilities, al-
though mainly Puerto Ricans suffered the brunt of the war on
drugs.
During my time on Rikers Island, I was going to court. My bail was
only $5,000. My foster mother spoke to the [Dominican] owner and
asked if he could bail me out. At that time, I had $10,000 out there in
the streets that different people owed me. He said, "well, whoever works
for me and gets arrested has got to be a man. Do the crime, do the
time." That right there pissed me off. Eventually, I came home. I
wanted to get even with this guy 'cause he played me. All that time, I
could have been at home. I could have fought the case outside. Five
thousand dollars, you're telling me that you couldn't bail me out? I
don't want to hear that."'
For many former street-level drug distributors like Ariel, go-
ing to jail-Rikers Island-capped many years of frustration, vic-
timization, and abuse. In jail, membership in the Latin Kings
offered them repudiation of the past and redemption.
" Curtis & Hamid, supra note 57, at 10.
"0 Interview with Ariel,John Jay College (Feb. 28, 1996).
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Before I was a King, I was a knucklehead. My temper got me kicked
out of school. I used to fight a lot with teachers. I used to sell drugs a lot
inside school. During my time on Rikers Island, I was in the position of
changing myself: stop selling drugs. I started seeing the light more and
wanted to follow a more spiritual path. It's not all about selling drugs
anymore. It's not all about taking. It's all about giving back to the
community. I took so much, now, it's time to give back. I want to stay in
the young tribe to help my younger brothers, to let them know that gang
banging is not the way of life. Believe me, I experienced it, I know it, I
lived it, and it's time for another path. I tried that path and I failed.
Now let me try this one."1
The Latin Kings solved many of the difficulties of young
Puerto Rican men and women who were incarcerated. The
most pressing problem was protection from other inmates. For
a first-time arrestee, membership in an organization which ap-
plied blanket protection throughout the prison system was a
blessing. It bestowed status and prestige, prevented victimiza-
tion, and allowed disputes with other members to be arbitrated
peacefully.
Gang membership was also advantageous on return to civil-
ian life. Where many members' households were chaotic, the
gang functioned as an alternative family which prescribed rules
and justifications for behavior, thereby bringing order and
structure into potentially unmanageable social and emotional
situations. The gangs imposed organization, government, and
order on marginalized individuals. To break the hold which
drug distributors and their lifestyle had held on local youth for
so long, the leadership provided realistic alternatives and a
strong social support network. Clave, a leader of the Netas,
spoke about the lure of drugs on local youth:
Like myself, I sold, I used. We recognize the difficulty that some
people have had and what leads them to these things. So, before they go
and fall, we go and pick them up as quick as possible. In order to help
somebody, you've got to be more than concerned."
"01 &e




Tapping into the overwhelming sense of chaos, powerless-
ness, and fear which had gripped neighborhood youth, Latin
Kings and &etas projected an unabashedly Puerto Rican image
and solution to the problem. The organizations became the
rage among Bushwick youth in 1993-94 and membership
soared, even among those who had not been front-line partici-
pants or victims of the war on drugs. Youth who did not em-
brace the Latino cause as feverently as Latin Kings and Netas
still found themselves attracted to the nationalist symbolism and
ideas that percolated through the neighborhood, especially
those regarding the importance of family and community, and
the long-term destructive effects of violence and drugs. Not co-
incidentally, the summer of 1993 marked the appearance of the
Puerto Rican flag necklace (made from plastic beads) as the
must-have clothing accessory among local youth throughout the
city. Teaching youths a relatively safe passage through neigh-
borhood mine fields, organizations like the Latin Kings and
Netas may well have lowered the level of violence that might
have existed in their absence. Paul, a leader of the Netas, ex-
plained how they kept members in check.
Whatever the problem is, I'll talk with them and after that they'll
say, "you're right, it's not worth it" and they'll leave. And I feel like I've
done myjob, I've stopped a brother from making a wrong decision and
probably end up hurting somebody and going to jail because he forgot
for a moment that he's a Neta, that there's other ways to handle things.
This is what we're taught. We're taught to avoid problems at all costs. If
someone is going to hurt you, then you have a right to defend yourself.
'Cause that's all we are, we're just people like everybody else. But the
way we fight is with our mouths. We talk our way out of situations.
'Cause that's not what we're about, we're about living in peace and har-
mony and improving our lives.' 3
In these forms of grass roots socio-cultural and political or-
ganizing, lower class/"underclass" youths adapted progressively
and more or less composedly to pressures of adolescent devel-
opment, alterations of family structure and in legal/illegal labor
"' Interview with Paul, conducted in Bushwick, N.Y. (May 27, 1995).
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markets.4 Latin Kings and &etas set new standards of behavior
for many neighborhood youth, but with swarms of adolescents
clamoring for entry, the organizations had become too popular
and unwieldy, and in 1995, they took steps to limit membership.
&etas became very popular out here a few years ago and a. lot of
young people joined at that time. But a lot of them got taken out of the
association because they were too young. Others got taken out because
they weren't up to our standards. There's still great interest in the
community in becoming aNeta. A lot of people want tojoin. Every day,
about 10 or 20 people ask me about it. We deny a lot of people entry.
Because first we have to find out about them. We first find out where
they live, we go and investigate, we watch them, we see the things that
they do, we see if they go to school. If they're young, they've got to go to
school. We don't accept any youth who's not in school. If they're not in
school, they've got to get into school. Just like an adult, you've got to
work. You have to do something. Because if he's not doing it, we know
that sooner or later he's going to be fucking up. And he's going to be
getting into drug selling or whatever. If a member loses his job and be-
come unemployed, we help him look for ajob. We're all over the place,
so usually we bump into opportunities, job openings and stuff like that."5
Despite the stated goals of Latin Kings and &etas to uplift
the community and transform the lives of young people, vio-
lence continued to be an integral part of neighborhood life for
many youth, and selling drugs remained one of the only ways to
earn money. But even those who continued to sell drugs found
that their routines had been dramatically transformed by an al-
tered neighborhood terrain; drug markets were now much
more integrated into the community and less violent.
VII. THE NEW DRUG DISTRIBUTORS: BOLO'S BLOCK:
Attacked by the occupying army of police in September
1992, drug business "owners" initially responded by simply re-
placing low-level workers who were arrested, but greater busi-
ness losses and violence followed as antagonism between
4 See MIcHAEL BRAKE, CoMPARAT EYOUTH CULTUREs 189-90 (1985); Dwight Con-
quergood, On Reppin' and Rhetoric: Gang Representations 22-24 (April 8,
1992) (Unpublished manuscript presented at the Philosophy and Rhetoric of Inquiry
Seminar, University of Iowa, on file with The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology).




Dominican management and Puerto Rican labor worsened.
Most disbanded, while the remainder downsized and moved off
the street. New distributors were soon challenging them. As
one of the latter commented:
The police made my business. They created it. Before, there was a
line of people standing on the street waiting to cop out of the door of a
building, look-outs up and down the block. Who'd bother to call me on
the beeper? Wouldn't have to. You could buy it like it was a supermar-
ket. [But when the police destroyed them,] they created my business."
Many of the new drug selling organizations which formed
or flourished when the monopoly enjoyed by the corporate
owners was broken were not simply smaller, more discreet ver-
sions of the supermarket vendors, they were qualitatively differ-
ent. Characterized by transactions that were dependent upon
familiarity and trust between participants, undercover police
were less able to make drug buys and were forced into tedious
surveillance of suspected street-level drug markets (from roof-
tops, apartment windows or parked vehicles) in the hope of wit-
nessing a sale.
One such new business was run by Bolo, a thirty year old
Puerto Rican who grew up in Bushwick and ran a crack selling
operation from 1990 to 1996 on the corner of his block, located
about six blocks from the main drug supermarket discussed ear-
lier. His business, which employed about twenty-five people,
generated about $5,000 per day in sales-average sized by Bush-
wick standards. Bolo's business had both local and drive-
through customers, most of whom were quickly recognized by
the workers. The business operated seven days a week, from
around 10:00 A.M. until 1:00 or 2:00 A.M. or whenever business
got slow, but not around the clock as was the case with corpo-
rate sellers.
Bolo and his "associates" were well aware that their business
was quite different from the corporate sellers who had domi-




nated street-level sales several blocks to the north. Below, he
characterizes the corporate distributors:
Fishman [Street] is the only international spot where they have
Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and whites, where everybody's working. Other ar-
eas they do not. The guys who run Fishman are good, but they're
sloppy. So many of those guys are in prison from Fishman. Nobody with
a mind [works there]. All they care is "hey, fuck the workers. As long as
my money comes .... that kind of attitude.' 7
Several of Bolo's associates had formerly worked for the
corporate "owners" on Fishman Street. For EZ, a father of five
young children, it had been an embittering experience:
I came home [from prison] about a month ago. While I was gone,
my wife survived with the help of her mother and stepfather. She was
also on public assistance. The guys who I worked for had said that if I
got locked up that they'd look out for her, but they never even gave her
a quarter for her to call me. They never helped her with anything. She
struggled on her own until I got home. It's lucky that I put money away
to allow her to cope with the first few months. If not, we'd probably be
living in the street right now. As soon as I came home they asked if I
wanted to work. I told them that I didn't want to work and that since
they hadn't helped me while I was in prison I knew that they wouldn't
help me if I got locked up again."
Cibo, a manager for Bolo's business, talked with regret
about his prior experience working in the area dominated by
corporate sellers. The violence and fear that were part and par-
cel of that arena had turned him into a person that his wife and
family scarcely recognized:
Too many people started coming on that block. The block, you
know, the street was changing. It wasn't fun anymore. It was getting too
dangerous. I got stopped twice. I didn't want nobody hanging out in
front of the spot. I didn't want the police there ever again. You got to
protect what is yours, man. I had a big disagreement with the Domini-
cans, so I ran upstairs and pulled out a .30-.30, a Winchester, and chased
them out to, what is the name of that club again? ... I got shot right in
'0 Interview with Bolo, conducted on Stanhope Street, Bushwick, N.Y. (Aug. 23,
1996).




front of it. It went through my leg. If it wasn't for my daughter's Godfa-
ther to jump on top of me and cover me, they would have fucked me up.
I left. I went to Puerto Rico, for like two weeks. I came back, and I
started staying home. My wife wouldn't let me go out.'"
Bolo and his associates were careful to be respectful of
neighborhood residents, acutely aware that the success of their
business was dependent upon their integration into the neigh-
borhood rather than their alienation from it as was the case with
the corporate distributors. As Bolo noted:
This is the suburbs. That's [Fishman St.] like New York, and this is
the suburbs, do you know what I'm saying? It is quiet, it's peaceful. You
got people walking .... people who do not buy drugs. I mean, you have
people walking, you know, shopping. Just mind your business, stay clean,
and you are okay. So, you don't see no bums or burnt down houses or
shit like that over here like you do over there. Yeah, you get beautiful
girls over here. You have to dress nice because you want to pick up girls.
You've got nice guys, they park their cars here. They go to work over
there, and you see the block. There is not that many abandoned cars
here. This is the suburbs, and that is like a pile of shit down there. And,
you know, this is like this because I maintain it like this. I demand this to
be like this. I don't want my workers fucking around with people. Do
you notice how many people walk by, and not one of these people called
the police on my guys? You don't disrespect nobody. My guys don't
make sales in front of kids or wives. You stop, let the customer wait, let
the pedestrian pass by, make sure it is clear, and then you make your
sale. Respect. That is all it is. You have to respect people, especially
when you are in a dirty game. You have to. There is no if, or buts or
maybes. Work with me, you have to respect, if not, go work for [the
owners on] Fishman St. and go to jail."'
While corporate distributors had specialized in public dis-
plays of violence to keep workers in line, Bolo never used it to
reprimand employees. He felt that such dramas were unneces-
sary because he knew his workers so well (including their fami-
lies) that it was nearly impossible for them to run away with
drugs or money. In addition, public violence had the effect of
attracting the police and instilling fear rather than building re-
o9 Interview with Cibo, conducted on the corner of Stanhope St. and Irving Ave.,
Bushwick, N.Y. (Sept. 27, 1995).




spect among other residents on the block. Below, he describes
how he handled problems with workers:
'When Cibo ran off with the profits the other day, I understood why
he did it. But that's ok. You got to learn to accept it and just carry on.
You can't get mad. You can never show people you get upset. I tell peo-
ple, "hey, what do you want to do now? You had a good time, and now
it's time to pay, right?" He said "yeah, yeah." "Are you going to come
Friday?" 'Yeah, I'll be here." He's there. He was a little embarrassed,
but he's got to do what he's got to do. Better to be embarrassed than
dead. That is a very ugly word. Being dead is an ugly word. You only get
one chance to die."'
Unlike corporate owners, Bolo cared about his workers and
the neighborhood. He hired only people who lived in the area
with their families and carefully scrutinized their motives for
wanting to join his organization. He made a conscious effort to
stay away from young drug sellers who publicly announced their
intention to use drug profits to buy fancy clothes, jewelry, or ex-
pensive cars:
Most of the fellows who work for me need the money. I mean, I'll
be honest with you, I'm not going to bring in a kid who just needs money
to buy a pair of sneakers. I will bring a guy with me that has to support
his family in one way or another. I mean, I told everybody, "nobody is
here getting rich. All we are doing is surviving. If you know how to save
and cut corners, you can have all the money to save."'
In interviews with his street-level workers, they all voiced
similar motivations for working-and none of them sported
flashy clothing, jewelry, or other consumer display items which
many people thought were characteristic of drug dealers. For
example, Robert (nineteen years old in 1995) cited the need to
support his mother who lived on welfare as his primary, purpose
for working:
..' Interview with Bolo, conducted in his apartment, Bushwick, N.Y. (Nov. 16,
1995).




It's fucked up because I'm the one ... I knew that my brother really
wasn't going to take care of my family, you understand, take care of my
mom and my father. It's that, damn, you know, if she fuckin' put food in
your mouth, fuckin' fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen
years-that's your mother! She brought you into this world. You're
supposed to help her when she needs it. He doesn't help her; that's my
brother and everything, he's a selfish bastard! He only thinks of him-
self.'"
An eighteen-year-old worker, Mano, also contributed heavily
to his family's household income. His unemployed father,
Manuel, feared for Mano's safety and often sat nearby whenever
Mano worked to "watch his back."
I live in an apartment in this building with my wife and two kids. I
seen 'em grow here. Two boys, fifteen and eighteen. You interviewed
the eighteen year old. He gets hung up with all this (pointing to the
street). I try to keep my eye on him. They don't steal it from nobody,
that's one thing. It's [dealing drugs] still bad, you know. The only thing
I say [to the police is], "take him if he's done something wrong." But
you don't have to beat on him, knock him all silly.
The guys that work out here work hard in a way, but it's still wrong.
I got my own opinions. Nobody puts a gun to nobody to use drugs. But
the law says that's a law .... I just say not to mistreat them, that's all.
That's the only thing that gets to me, the hitting, the way they treat
them. If they've got them, put the handcuffs on them and take them
away and do what you have to do. But why abuse them, start punching
on them, kicking them on the floor? I don't know what to do. I'm here
(sitting on the stoop) because of him. I know they're gonna.take him on
me, sooner or later."'"
By 1996, with crack sales continuing to decline throughout
the neighborhood, Bolo decided to get out of the drug busi-
ness. With a wife and eighteen-month old son, he wanted a life
for his family that did not include the constant threat of arrest
or violent confrontation in the street. His wife found an office
job in Manhattan and he found a security job in the neighbor-
hood. Giving up his claim to the corner, he advised his younger
associates to get out of the business and pursue legitimate jobs
... Interview with Robert, conducted as he sold crack on Stanhope St., Bushwick,
N.Y. (Sept.. 25, 1995).
"4 Interview with Manuel, conducted on the stoop of his apartment building on
Irving Avenue, Bushwick, N.Y. (Aug. 19, 1996).
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or complete their education. When Dominican crack dealers
moved in to assert control over his once-lucrative spot, several of
Bolo's workers signed on with them for a short period of time.
Frenchy was arrested within one week and plea-bargained a sen-
tence of two to four years in prison. After getting arrested and
spending a short time in jail, Robert found ajob as a messenger
on Wall Street and then shocked his friends by falling into a
well-paying job at a brokerage house. Mano, after one arrest,
and under pressure from his parents, girlfriend, and probation
officer, gave up dealing drugs and began to spend increasing
amounts of time inside the house, watching TV and listening to
music. Cibo moved out of the neighborhood and took a con-
struction job. Twin, a beefy seventeen year old, had sold part-
time for Bolo when he was laid off from his job as a stockboy in
a shoe store on Grand Street in Williamsburg, but when Bolo
quit, Twin went back to searching for legitimate employment.
Even after they quit the business, Bolo and several former
associates continued to get arrested. The decline in crime in
New York City had not been accompanied by fewer arrests, but
paradoxically, by more arrests.1 5 After having built up armies of
specialized squads in the last decade, the police had an empire
to maintain, and with fewer criminals to apprehend they never-
theless continued to manufacture "statistics" at an unprece-
dented rate. Following Kelling and Coles' advice,"6 the NYPD
began concentrating on low-level offenses as "a means of re-
straining 'wannabes,' the less-dedicated-to-crime friends and as-
sociates of repeat offenders. Many in this group, if pressured,
or if schools and police pressure their parents, ultimately will
change their behavior to conform to more appropriate and de-
cent standards."
But by arresting Bolo and his former associates, the police
locked up the converted, the "had beens" rather than the "wan-
nabes," and thereby endangered the very transformation they
sought to achieve.
"'Michael Cooper, You're Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, § 13, at 1.
116 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNrrIS 248 (1996).
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In. summary, the reconfiguration of drug markets in the
mid-1990s appreciably reduced the level of neighborhood vio-
lence. As distribution retired indoors, turf battles were elimi-
nated. Since organizers of drug businesses hired a few trusted
friends rather than easily replaceable workers, there was less
conflict between them. Distributors were robbed by users less
frequently because they were more protected selling indoors to
known customers. Like other neighborhood residents, drug
distributors and users had also adapted and contributed to
dramatic changes in neighborhood conditions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The future of inner-cities in the global economy of the ap-
proaching millennium does not appear particularly bright. The
residents of inner city neighborhoods did not share equally in
the fruits of the economic revitalization of the 1990s which cre-
ated new (though less secure and rewarding) jobs and low un-
employment, and led to an optimism not seen since the post-
WWII economy of the 1950s. For inner city residents, the econ-
omy did not promise prosperity, security, or upward mobility,
but rather, more unemployment, underemployment and sub-
stantially less help from local, state, and federal agencies to
combat poverty and its effects. But in spite of their marginal-
ized status and bleak prospects, many inner city residents not
only forestalled their expected slide into economic ruin and so-
cial disintegration, but also confounded the schools of eco-
nomic, cultural, and genetic determinism that had predicted a
steady march toward oblivion. They showed a new vitality,
graphically illustrated by precipitous drops in crime and vio-
lence.
Yet many scholars, journalists, and policy makers continue
to believe that poor people are incapable of helping themselves,
much less their communities, and the urge to explain their
turnaround on external factors is great. The most popular of
these unidimensional explanations is that innovations in polic-
ing (especially in the area of technology) are driving the ex-
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traordinary transformation of inner city neighborhoods.117 With
great fanfare Mayor Giuliani and the New York City Police De-
partment introduced their "quality of life" campaign as the key-
stone ingredient in turning the city around. They hammered
this message home to the public and the media, but most ur-
gently, to rank and file police officers who were instructed to
aggressively pursue even the most petty offense, like jaywalking,
riding bicycles on sidewalks, loitering, trespassing, or drinking
beer in public. They contended that by concentrating on the
"little things, the big things will take care of themselves," but
with fewer serious crimes occurring and drug distributors more
difficult to catch, police were simply left with the lesser ones. As
one journalist had noted,
Statistically speaking, you are more likely to be arrested these days. Al-
though major crimes are down in the city, arrests are up, way up. Under
Mayor Giuliani's crackdown on 'quality of life' crimes, the police have
arrested 21 percent [sic] more people this year than last year. Mostly
for the little things.118
While aggressive policing certainly resulted in a reluctance
by many people to linger in public spaces, including the reviled
"obstreperous youth" who were said to spoil neighborhood civil-
ity,' 9 it can hardly account for the profound changes which oc-
curred in the daily lives of inner-city residents.
The combination of factors which precipitated inner-city
change vary from city to city and neighborhood to neighbor-
hood. In New York City, for example, rapidly declining rates of
crime and violence, the hallmarks of this urban renaissance,
have been observed in every neighborhood, not simply those
where conditions had become intolerable. To disentangle and
account for the multiple influences which frame behavior and
the choices people make, it is useful to examine the intimate
contexts where people learn to become human and construct
117 See, eg., David C. Anderson, Crime Stoppers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1997 § 6 at 47;
George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New
York City Stoy, 88J. CRIM. LAw& CRMNOLOG-Y 1217 (1998).
1.8 Cooper, supra note 115, at 1.
" KELLING & COLES, supra note 116, at 242-51.
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their lives-families, social networks, workplaces and communi-
ties. Regardless of the constellation of variables which precipi-
tated the startling turnaround observed in inner-city
neighborhoods, the capacity of people to alter their everyday
lives and confound the "experts" has been highlighted in the
current period. After being socially, culturally, economically,
politically, and physically stripped, demolished, and decon-
structed for more than thirty years, northeast Brooklyn was ripe
for rebuilding in the 1990s. In Bushwick, where neighborhood
conditions had become intolerable, young people were at the
forefront of this effort. They responded to the multiple threats
against their daily lives and futures by repudiating those ele-
ments which endangered them: unchecked street-level drug
markets, out-of-control violence, and hard drugs. The palpable
change which washed over the neighborhood beginning in 1993
was initiated and carried through by young residents who,
though far from uniform in their responses to those dangers,
shared a conviction that they would not succumb to the same
fate that nearly erased the preceding generation. In altering
their own lives, they shattered the myth that they were powerless
against a "criminogenic" environment which was said to mass-
produce superpredators, and threw into question the canon
that violence must beget violence.
Life in the postmodern global economy is one in which
identity formation is less dependent upon the influence of fam-
ily, neighborhood, race/ethnicity, nationality and history,120 and
more than anywhere else, the inner-city is an empty canvas, an
urban frontier where new structures, institutions and conven-
tions are waiting to be built. Where the unprecedented changes
that the current generation have begun are going, and whether
they can be sustained is uncertain, but the outcome is by no
means predetermined. In the face of the many obstacles which
inner-city residents must still overcome, our failure to recognize
and reward their struggle to build a better world may yet prove
the naysayers right.
"0 See generally GIDDENS, supra note 8; MILLER, supra note 8.
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